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Abstract 
 
Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the most widely used protocols in the 
Internet. The main purpose of the DNS protocol is mapping user-friendly domain 
names to IP addresses. Unfortunately, many cyber criminals deploy the DNS 
protocol for malicious purposes, such as botnet communications. In this type of 
attack, the botmasters tunnel communications between the Command and Control 
(C&C) servers and the bot-infected machines within DNS request and response. 
Designing an effective approach for botnet detection has been done previously 
based on specific botnet types Since botnet communications are characterized by 
different features, botmasters may evade detection methods by modifying some of 
these features. This research aims to design and implement a multi-staged detection 
approach for Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), Fast Flux Service Network, and 
Domain Flux-based botnets, as well as encrypted DNS tunneled-based botnets using 
the BRO Network Security Monitor. This approach is able to detect DNS-based 
botnet communications by relying on analyzing different techniques used for finding 
the C&C server, as well as encrypting the malicious traffic. 
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Chapter I: Introduction  
Introduction 
Cyber-attacks, including malware injection, never stop threatening computer 
networks and information systems. One of the predominant forms of spreading 
malware is infecting systems with malicious software forcing them to act as botnets. 
These botnets often utilize Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to hide their 
communication with their Command & Control (C&C) servers. This research aims to 
design and implement a multi-staged detection approach for Domain Generation 
Algorithm (DGA), Fast Flux Service Network, and Domain Flux-based botnets, as 
well as encrypted DNS tunneled-based botnets using BRO Network Security Monitor. 
Domain Name System is the Internet’s equivalent of a phone book and a 
central part of the Internet, providing a mechanism for naming resources in such a 
way that the names are usable in different hosts, networks, protocol families, 
internets, and administrative organizations (RFC 883). In other words, DNS 
translates more readily memorized domain names to numerical IP addresses needed 
for locating and identifying computing devices and services (Domain Name System, 
2017).  
According to Wikipedia, mapping a simpler and more memorable name to a 
numerical address dates back to the ARPANET era (1969-1990). The Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) maintained a text file named HOSTS.TXT to map host 
names to the numerical addresses of computers on the ARPANET. Each time a host 
had to connect to the network, it would have to download the latest version of the 
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table. At that time, the addresses were assigned manually, but by the early 1980s, 
keeping a single and centralized host table had turned out to become slow and 
unwieldy, creating the need for an automated naming system. The Domain Name 
System was created by Paul Mockapetris and the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) published the original specifications in RFC 882 and RFC 883 in November 
1983 (Domain Name System, 2017).  
A botnet, or robot network, is a collection of Internet-connected computers 
(bots) that are infected with a specific malware that allows these bots to be remotely 
controlled by a Command and Control (C&C) server (What is a Botnet Attack?-
Definition, n.d.). Although DNS protocol is typically used for benign purposes, it can 
be used to port malicious packets. Domain Name System protocol can be abused at 
different stages of the communication process with botnets, which may implement 
some techniques to circumvent the detection methods.  
Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), Fast-Flux Service Network (FFSN), 
Domain Flux1, Double Flux, and DNS tunneling can be used as evasion techniques in 
botnet communications (Dietrich et al., 2011; Farnham & Atlasis, 2013; Lysenko, 
Pomorova, Savenko, Kryshchuk, & Bobrovnikova, 2015). In DGA, a large number of 
short-lived domain names are generated. While the DNS A-record (IP address) for a 
specific malicious domain name changes frequently in FFSN, the DF changes the 
C&C server’s domain name repeatedly by implementing short TTL period. With DNS 
                                            
1 DF will be used in this document to refer to Domain Flux. 
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tunneling, botnet communications with C&C servers can be wrapped and tunneled 
through DNS packets.  
BRO Network Security Monitor is a powerful and open-source network 
analysis framework (The Bro Network Security Monitor, n.d.). The initial version of 
BRO was designed and implemented by Vern Paxson in 1995. BRO focuses on 
network security monitoring, and provides a comprehensive platform for more 
general network traffic analysis tasks even outside of the security domain, including 
performance measurements and helping with troubleshooting.  
BRO is not a classic signature-based intrusion detection system (IDS). While it 
supports such standard functionality as well, BRO supports a wide range of analyses 
through its scripting language which indeed facilitates a much broader spectrum of 
very different approaches to finding malicious activity, including semantic misuse 
detection, anomaly detection, and behavioral analysis (Bro Introduction, n.d.). 
Problem Statement 
Different botnets implement different protocols to communicate with C&C 
servers. As the Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the least monitored protocols 
from a security perspective, many cyber criminals abuse DNS to tunnel botnet 
communications, and some of the tunneling tools may encrypt the payload to evade 
detection. According to Dietrich et al. (2011), "DNS is usually one of the few 
protocols- if not the only one- that is allowed to pass without further ado" (p. 10), thus 
making it an attractive means of botnet tunneling. Furthermore, many botnet 
detection methods can be evaded by some techniques such as DGA, FFSN, and DF 
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(Lysenko et al., 2015). This makes the detection and prevention efforts more 
complicated.  
Domain Name System protocol can be abused at different stages of the botnet 
communication process, such as finding the C&C server, transmitting data, and/or 
controlling the bots. At the initial stage of botnet communication, a bot tries to find its 
C&C server by sending DNS requests to resolve the domain name(s) of the malicious 
server. After finding the C&C server, the communications between C&C server and 
the bot start. These communications may include data exfiltration, data infiltration, or 
controlling the bot to perform malicious actions against other systems. 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Botnets have become one of the most significant concerns on the Internet. 
"According to a report from Russian-based Kaspersky Labs, botnets–not spam, 
viruses, or worms … pose the biggest threat to the Internet. A report from Symantec 
came to a similar conclusion" (Newman, 2010). Botnet malware can be used against 
any Internet connected device, including smart televisions, to execute a wide range 
of malicious actions. These actions include launching a distributed denial-of-service 
(DDoS), phishing, generating and sending spam messages, propagating malware, 
sniffing information, hosting malicious content, and using infected bots for proxy 
activities (Bots and Botnets–A Growing Threat, 2016). Table 1 shows some malicious 
activities that are executed against or by botnet-infected machines. 
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Table 1 
 
Variety of Botnet Automated Activities 
 
Data exfiltration against 
bots 
Data infiltration against 
bots 
Activities performed by 
bots 
• Stealing sensitive 
information 
• Installing malware 
• Sending spams 
• Lunching DoS 
• Click fraud 
• Proxy activities 
 
The resiliency and dynamic nature of botnets pose challenges to detection 
methods, like when the botmasters change the botnets’ characteristics to avoid 
detection methods. Designing and implementing a detection mechanism for DNS-
based botnets will rely on analysis of botnet features, and implementation of 
detection methods and existing evasion techniques. 
Objective of the Study  
Using BRO Network Security Monitor, the main objective of this study is to 
design and implement an effective detection technique for DNS-based botnets using 
rule-based and signature-based techniques in two phases. The first phase will 
implement a rule-based mechanism to detect the existence of DGA, FFSN, or DF 
based botnets, which are utilized to find the C&C server. The second phase will 
implement a signature-based mechanism to detect DNS tunneling, which is utilized to 
wrap malicious traffic in DNS packets. 
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Limitations of the Study 
This study required a group of real botnet-infected machines and C&C servers. 
Network traffic of previously infected machines were used for analysis and design of 
the proposed detection mechanism of the DGA, FFSN, and DF implementations. 
Definition of Terms  
Table 2 
 
Definition of Terms Used in This Document 
 
Term  Definition 
Authoritative  
Name Server (NS)  
A name server that provides actual, original and definitive answer to DNS 
queries such as – mail server IP address (MX resource record) or web 
site IP address (A resource record). It does not provide just cached 
answers that were obtained from another name server.  
 
What Is Authoritative Name Server? (2009, August 17). Retrieved March 
25, 2017, from https://www.dnsknowledge.com/whatis/authoritative-
nameserver/ 
Botmaster  A person who operates the command and control of botnets for remote 
process execution.  
 
DDoS Attack Definitions - DDoSPedia. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, 
from https://security.radware.com/ddos-
knowledgecenter/ddospedia/botmaster/ 
Botnet (Zombie  
Army)  
An interconnected network of computers infected with malware without the 
user's knowledge and controlled by cybercriminals. 
 
What is a Botnet Attack? - Definition. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, 
from https://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-securitycenter/threats/botnet-
attacks#.WN3sKYWcE2w 
Command and  
Control Server  
(C&C)  
A computer that controls and issues commands to members of a botnet. 
Botnet members may be referred to zombies and the botnet itself may be 
referred to as a zombie army. 
What is command-and-control servers (C&C center)? - Definition from 
WhatIs.com. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/command-andcontrol-server-CC-
server 
Covert Channel  A mechanism for sending and receiving information data between 
machines without alerting any firewalls and IDS’s on the network.  
IDFAQ: What is covert channel and what are some examples?  
(n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from https://www.sans.org/security-
resources/idfaq/what-is-covertchannel-and-what-are-some-examples/2/17 
Distributed  
Denial of Service  
A type of DoS attack where multiple compromised systems, which are 
often infected with a Trojan, are used to target a single system causing a 
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 Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Victims of a DDoS attack consist of both 
the end targeted system and all systems maliciously used and controlled 
by the hacker in the distributed attack. 
Beal, V. (n.d.). DDoS attack - Distributed Denial of Service. Retrieved 
March 25, 2017, from 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DDoS_attack.html 
DNS Tunneling  The ability to encode the data of other programs or protocols in DNS 
queries and responses.  
 
What is DNS Tunneling? (2017, January 04). Retrieved March 25, 2017, 
from https://www.plixer.com/blog/networksecurity-forensics/what-is-dns-
tunneling/ 
Domain Flux (DF) A technique for keeping a malicious botnet in operation by constantly 
changing the domain name of the botnet owner's  
Command and Control (C&C) server.  
What is domain fluxing? - Definition from WhatIs.com. (n.d.). Retrieved 
March 25, 2017, from 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/domain-fluxing  
Domain  
Generation  
Algorithm (DGA) 
A class of algorithm that takes a seed as an input, outputs a string and 
appends a top-level domain (TLD) such as .com, .ru, .uk, etc. in order to 
form a possible domain name. The seed is a piece of information 
accessible to both the botmaster and the infected host now acting as a bot. 
 
Why Domain Generating Algorithms (DGAs)? -. (2016, August 17). 
Retrieved March 25, 2017, from http://blog.trendmicro.com/domain-
generating-algorithms-dgas/ 
Double Flux  A DNS technique used by botnets to provide an additional layer of 
redundancy by changing the DNS A-records and authoritative NS-records 
continually for malicious domain using the round robin algorithm. 
Fast Flux Networks Working and Detection, Part 1. (2015, February 13).  
 
Retrieved March 25, 2017, from http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/fast-
flux-networks-workingdetection-part-1/#gref 
Dynamic Domain  
Name System  
(DDNS)  
A method of automatically updating a name server in the Domain Name 
System (DNS), often in real time, with the active DDNS configuration of its 
configured hostnames, addresses or other information.  
 
Dynamic DNS. (2017, February 18). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_DNS 
Fast Flux or Single 
Flux (FFSN) 
A DNS technique used by botnets to associate a single domain name with 
many IP addresses and to hide phishing and malware delivery sites behind 
an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies.  
Fast flux. (2017, March 20). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_flux 
Metamorphic and 
polymorphic malware  
Two categories of malicious software programs that have the ability to 
change their code as they propagate. With polymorphism, each time the 
bot binary propagates, it encrypts its original code to avoid pattern 
recognition. Instead of the code encryption, metamorphism changes the 
code to an equivalent one each time. 
 
What is metamorphic and polymorphic malware? - Definition from 
WhatIs.com. (n.d.). Retrieved March 26, 2017, from 
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http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/metamorphicand-
polymorphic-malware 
Network Address  
Translation (NAT)  
The process where a network device, usually a firewall, assigns a public 
address to a computer (or group of computers) inside a private network. 
The main use of NAT is to limit the number of public IP addresses an 
organization or company must use, for both economy and security 
purposes.  
 
What is Network Address Translation (NAT)? (n.d.). Retrieved  
March 25, 2017, from http://whatismyipaddress.com/nat 
Resource  
Records  
The data elements that define the structure and content of the domain 
name space. All DNS operations are ultimately  
formulated in terms of resource records.  
Resource Records. (n.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2017, from 
http://www.freesoft.org/CIE/Course/Section2/8.htm 
Single Flux  The simplest type of fast flux, characterized by multiple individual nodes 
within the network registering and de-registering their IP addresses as 
part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single domain name. This 
combines round robin DNS with very short time to live - usually less than 
five minutes - to create a constantly changing list of destination 
addresses for that single DNS name. Fast flux. (2017, March 08). 
Retrieved March 25, 2017, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_flux#Single-flux_and_doubleflux 
Zombie  A computer connected to the Internet that has been compromised by a 
hacker, computer virus or Trojan horse program, and can be used to 
perform malicious tasks of one sort or another under remote direction.  
Zombie (computer science). (2017, March 22). Retrieved March  
25, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zombie_(computer_science) 
 
Summary  
This chapter covered an introduction about botnets and their significance. 
Also, DNS protocol and how it is abused in favor of botnet communication, as well as 
some common evasion techniques used to circumvent botnet-detection methods. 
The next chapter provides an overview of botnets, more details about DNS-based 
botnet-detection methods and evasion techniques with a detailed review of existing 
literature.  
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Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature  
Introduction   
Botnets use various communication protocols to tunnel and hide themselves 
from detection. Also, they may use encryption techniques to encrypt the tunnel itself. 
These evasion techniques complicate the detection process.  
Research communities have proposed many different approaches for botnet 
detection. Many of these approaches are based on a specific type of botnet. Studying 
and analyzing different botnet features, implemented detection approaches, and 
evasion techniques will be helpful in designing and implementing a new approach for 
detecting DNS-based botnets at different stages of communications. 
Background Related to the Problem  
Most computers that are co-opted to serve in botnet are often home-based 
and are inadequately protected by an effective firewall or other safeguard (Rouse, 
2012). According to Trend Micro, the two pieces of malware that started the botnet 
usage were Sub7 and Pretty Park–a Trojan and a Worm, respectively 
(CounterMeasures–A Security Blog, 2010). These malwares introduced the concept 
of a victim machine connecting to an IRC channel to listen for malicious commands. 
These two pieces of malware first surfaced in 1999 and botnet innovation has been 
constant since then. Steadily, botnets migrated away from the original IRC Command 
& Control (C&C) channel to communicate over HTTP, ICMP, SSL, and DNS ports, 
often using custom protocols.  
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Botnet structure has evolved over time to evade detection and disruption. Bots 
are traditionally constructed as clients which communicate via central servers. 
Theses bots connect to one or more servers through one or more domains, allowing 
the botmaster to perform with total control from a remote location. The centralized 
C&C model introduces a single point of failure; if the C&C domain is identified and 
dismantled, the botmaster loses control over the entire botnet (Antonakakis et al., 
2012). To solve the problem of security, researchers and authorities target botnet 
domains and C&C servers. Many recent botnets now rely on peer-to-peer networks 
to communicate. These P2P bot programs perform the same actions as the client- 
server model without the need for a central server to communicate (Botnet, 2017).  
In a peer-to-peer model, incoming connections to computers–that are behind a 
Network Address Translation (NAT) gateway, firewall, or proxy server–cannot be 
established. This would prevent most bots being connected to by other bots. In a 
client-server model, this obviously is not a problem as the bots connect to the server, 
so a peer-to-peer network still requires servers in a way (Peer-to-Peer Botnets for 
Beginners, 2016).  
Bots that are not behind a proxy / NAT / firewall can accept incoming 
connections and act as servers. These bots are usually referred to as nodes or 
peers, whereas the bots that do not accept incoming connections are usually referred 
to as workers. In a peer-to-peer model, the workers connect to one or more nodes to 
receive command(s). These nodes are technically servers, and the workers are 
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distributed between many nodes. This scenario allows the workers to shift to another 
node if one is dismantled.  
Peer-to-Peer botnets present more challenges for detection authorities; it is 
impractical to take all the nodes down since the nodes are legitimate devices. They 
cannot simply be seized like a server would be (Peer-to-Peer Botnets for Beginners, 
2016). Figure 1 shows the two communication models: client-server model between 
workers and C&C server and peer-to-peer model between nodes and workers. 
 
Figure 1. Botnet architectures. 
 
Botnets core components include C&C server(s) and zombies. Upon 
successful infection, the infected machine tries to connect to the C&C server at the 
initial stage. There are different ways to find the C&C server: a) the IP address or the 
domain name of the C&C server is hard coded in the malware, b) the malware 
implements Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA), c) the malware implements Fast-
Flux Service Network (FFSN), or d) the malware implements Domain Flux (DF). In 
19  
 
the hard coding implementation, it is easy for defenders, upon botnet discovery, to 
block a specific IP address or domain name. However, with DGA, it is difficult to block 
tens of thousands of unpredictable generated domain names, and the problem 
becomes more complicated when implementing DGA, FFSN, and DF together, thus, 
the traditional blacklisting technique based on the IP address or domain name is 
ineffective, and it is difficult to trace a large number of nodes ready to register their IP 
addresses to a domain name(s). 
A botnet that implements DGA generates tens of thousands of domain names 
per day. These domains are short-lived and blacklists will not be effective. As 
generated domains are predictable to the botmaster, they need to register only one of 
the domains to initiate C&C connection, whereas defenders need to block any 
generated domains that are registered to completely eliminate C&C activity (Hagen & 
Luo, 2016). 
In FFSN, the basic concept is having multiple IP addresses associated with a 
single domain name, and then constantly changing them in quick succession. If one 
or more of them drop, others quickly take their place (Albors, 2017). Figure 2 shows 
how botmasters use bots (flux agents) to act as proxies to the C&C server. 
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Figure 2: Fast-Flux service network. 
 
Using FFSN, a domain name resolves different IP addresses depending on 
the exact time in which the petition is made, which enables the decentralization of the 
C&C servers and complicates unraveling the structure of the botnet. To carry out the 
IP resolution changes, these domains have very low TTL in the cache, which forces 
the DNS systems to frequently refresh the resolution cache of the IP addresses 
associated to the domain. In the case of a null TTL, the resolution is not even stored. 
Therefore, those DNS petitions whose TTL is low are suspicious (Cantón, 2015). 
Table 3 illustrates the Concept of Domain Flux. 
Table 3 
 
Domain Flux Implementation 
 
Time IP Address Domain Name 
T1 1.1.1.1   3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 botnet.com 
T2 1.1.1.1   3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 malicious.com 
T3 1.1.1.1   3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 C&C.com 
T4 1.1.1.1   3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 suspicious.com 
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In DF, the botnets evade the detection by implementing short TTL periods and 
cycling of IP mappings for the domain name of C&C-servers (Lysenko et al., 2015). 
Table 4 illustrates the concept of FFSN and DF combination. The DF can be 
implemented along with DGA or can be utilized by instructing bot(s)–already 
connected–to request different domains next time. 
Table 4 
 
FFSN & DF Implementation 
 
Time IP Address Domain Name 
T1 1.1.1.1   5.5.5.5 botnet.com 
T2 3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 malicious.com 
T3 2.2.2.2   9.9.9.9 C&C.com 
T4 3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 botnet.com 
T5 1.1.1.1   5.5.5.5 C&C.com 
T6 2.2.2.2   9.9.9.9 malicious.com 
T7 3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 C&C.com 
T8 2.2.2.2   9.9.9.9 botnet.com 
T9 1.1.1.1   5.5.5.5 malicious.com 
T10 3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 malicious.com 
T11 2.2.2.2   9.9.9.9 botnet.com 
T12 3.3.3.3   7.7.7.7 C&C.com 
 
In DNS tunneling, a botmaster can abuse the Domain Name Service protocol, 
if the DNS traffic is not restricted, to establish a C&C channel between the bot(s) and 
the C&C server. These channels are difficult to detect and block. Some DNS 
tunneling tools support SSH, such as Iodine and DNS2TCP. These tools can be 
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utilized to encrypt botnet communications to complicate traffic inspection. Figure 3 
shows how a bot communicates with a C&C server through DNS tunnel. 
 
 
Figure 3. DNS tunneling. 
 
Literature Review 
Dynamic domain generation, fluxing, and tunneling techniques have been 
used by different malware families to avoid detection and complicate mitigation 
efforts. Research communities have proposed many different approaches and 
mechanisms for the development of the botnet-detection techniques. Many of these 
approaches are effective for specific types of botnet. 
Bilge, Sen, Balzarotti, Kirda, and Kruegel (2011) identified a feature vector with 
15 different features for malicious domain detection. These features are classified 
into four feature sets:  
1. Time-Based Features. 
2. DNS Answer-Based Features. 
3. TTL Value-Based Features. 
4. Domain Name-Based Features. 
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Table 5 shows that each feature set has a different feature for malicious 
domain detection. 
Table 5 
 
Feature Vector (Bilge et al., 2011) 
 
Feature Set Feature Name 
Time-Based Feature 1- Short life 
2- Daily Similarity 
3- Repeating patterns 
4- Access ratio 
 
DNS Answer-Based Features 5- Number of distinct IP addresses 
6- Number of distinct countries 
7- Number of domains share the IP with 
8- Reverse DNS query results 
TTL Value-Based Features  9- Average TTL 
10- Standard Deviation of TTL 
11- Number of distinct TTL values 
12- Number of TTL change 
13- Percentage usage of specific TTL ranges 
Domain Name-Based Features 14- Percentages of numerical characters 
15- Percentage of the length of the LMS 
 
Krmíček (2011) examined the NetFlow1 of DNS IP traffic and its relation to the 
botnet presence in the monitored network. He studied the DNS behavior of known 
malicious and benign domains based on features identified by Bilge, Sen, Balzarotti, 
Kirda, and  Kruegel (2011). Since NetFlow inspects only packet headers, not the 
                                            
1 Unidirectional sequence of packets with some common properties that pass through a network device. 
(p. 1).  
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entire packet payload, Krmíček concluded that "using NetFlow data solely, for the 
purpose of botnet detection is not possible" (p. 8), and he mentioned that extracting 
important information from the packet payload is the most promising approach for 
botnet detection.  
Choi, Lee, and Kim (2007) proposed a botnet detection mechanism by 
monitoring DNS traffic, which forms a group activity in DNS requests simultaneously 
sent by many distributed bots. Upon successful infection, the bots rally to a C&C 
server at an early stage. In other words, the bots will have to register with the C&C 
server. If the IP address of the C&C server in not hard coded, the bots use DNS in a 
rallying process, and the DNS traffic has unique features defined as group activity 
(Domain Names & Timestamps). Their mechanism uses the information of IP 
headers to detect botnets, irrespective of the protocol used.  
Choi et al. (2007) developed a mechanism to detect C&C server migration, 
where a botnet frequently changes its C&C server–to avoid dismantling–by migrating 
to a candidate C&C server using DDNS. The authors summarized the differences 
between botnet DNS traffic and legitimate DNS traffic in Table 6. 
Table 6 
 
Differences between Botnet and Legitimate DNS 
 
 Source IPs accessed 
to domain name 
Activity Appearance 
pattern 
DNS Type 
Botnet DNS Fixed size (Botnet 
members) 
Group 
activity 
Intermittently Usually DDNS 
Legitimate DNS Anonymous 
(Legitimate users) 
Non-group 
activity 
Randomly and 
continuously 
Usually DNS 
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There are some limitations to this mechanism: monitoring a huge scale of 
networks poses high processing times and presents significant problems. Also, their 
algorithms can be evaded when the botnet uses DNS only at initializing and never 
again (moreover, do not migrate the botnet). Furthermore, since their mechanism is 
based on the similarity of group activity, this makes it not suitable for detecting small 
numbers of infected machines in a monitored network. 
Dietrich et al. (2011) are the first to document DNS-based botnet C&C traffic. 
They presented a technique for DNS-based C&C traffic detection and another 
technique for malware sample classification based on their behavior. Their work is 
based on the high entropy of C&C messages generated by Feederbots; they utilized 
the fact that encrypted or compressed messages have high entropy.  
A limitation of their technique is that, for certain resource records, the 
distribution of byte values could be compared against the expected distribution (e.g., 
rdata of A RR contains IPv4 addresses). However, the IPv4 address space is not 
uniformly distributed (e.g., reserved addresses, such as private addresses or 
multicast addresses, might rarely show up in Internet DNS traffic), whereas other 
addresses, such as popular websites, might appear more often in DNS query results. 
Another limitation is that: 
Botmasters could restrict their C&C messages to very small sizes. In practice, 
message content could be stored in, e.g., 4 bytes of an A resource record’s 
rdata. In this case, our rdata features alone, which are applied to individual 
C&C message would not be able to detect these C&C messages as high 
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entropy messages because the statistical byte entropy of really short 
messages is very low, and our estimate of the alphabet size by counting the 
number of distinct byte is inaccurate for very short messages. (p. 15) 
Lysenko et al. (2015) proposed a DNS-based anti-evasion technique for botnet 
detection. Their technique is based on a cluster analysis of the features obtained 
from the payload of incoming DNS messages. The method uses the semi-supervised 
fuzzy c-means clustering. Figure 4 illustrates the functioning principle of the DNS-
based anti-evasion technique for botnet detection.  
 
 
Figure 4. Functioning principle of the DNS-based anti-evasion technique for botnet 
detection (Lysenko et al., 2015). 
 
According to Lysenko et al. (2015), their technique can detect fast flux, domain 
flux, cycling of IP mappings, and DNS tunneling evasion techniques with high 
efficiency. They claimed that passive analysis of DNS traffic leads to the detection of 
only particular malware. 
27  
 
Jin, Ichise, and Iida (2015) designed a botnet communication detection 
method by collecting authoritative NS records and their IP addresses, as well as 
monitoring direct outbound DNS queries. Their method is based on storing NS 
records with corresponding IP addresses of valid query response pairs, IP addresses 
of public DNS servers, and ISP specified DNS servers in a NS-IP database. Any 
destination IP address is not included in the previously achieved Name Server NS 
records, as well as its corresponding IP Address; a record is considered suspicious 
and should be investigated. In this way, "all unusual domain name resolution that 
uses direct outbound DNS query can be monitored" (p. 39).  
A DNS tunneling technique could evade their method.  Domain Name System 
tunneling can be used for a more robust C&C configuration. For example, a 
botmaster could register the malicious domain name and designate the system 
running dnscat2 server software as the authoritative DNS server for that domain. In 
this way, the bot machine would issue a DNS query for that malicious domain to the 
victim’s trusted DNS server, which would forward the query to the C&C server and 
return the adversary’s answer to the bot. In this scenario, the protected network can 
only access the trusted DNS server, but that DNS server can contact external DNS 
servers to resolve queries that it cannot resolve directly (Zeltser, 2016). Since the 
returned malicious answer is from an authoritative DNS server, it would be stored in 
the NS-IP whitelist database, resulting in false-negative alert.  
Holz, Gorecki, Rieck, and Freiling (2008) presented the first empirical study of 
FFSNs. They developed a metric that exploits the principles of FFSNs to derive an 
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effective mechanism for detecting new fast-flux domains in an automated way. They 
showed that the method is accurate, and they had very low false-positive and false-
negative rates. Based on their empirical observations, they found other information 
(e.g., whois lookups and MX records) as promising features for an extended version 
of their flux-score. 
Caglayan, Toothaker, Drapeau, Burke, and Eaton (2009) presented the first 
empirical study of detecting and classifying fast flux service networks (FFSNs) in real 
time. Their approach uses active and passive sensors derived from DNS monitoring 
and fusing the component sensors using a Bayesian classifier. The Fast Flux Monitor 
Architecture can detect single and double flux behavior in real time with acceptable 
false alarm rates. 
Dabbagh (2012) proposed a method for detecting IP ID and TTL covert 
channels. He proposed a method based on his observation that "operating systems 
choose initially a random number for the ID in the IP header and then increment it 
sequentially" (p. 1). He concluded that a packet is suspicious if the new packet has 
an IP ID smaller than the previous packets. Also, he stated that "detecting TTL covert 
channel is based on the fact that the network is stable" (p. 2). Therefore, the receiver 
side should not observe many variations in the TTL values in the IP header of the 
packets that are coming from the same source.  
A limitation of this method is when using NAT services, packets coming from 
different sources will have different IDs and TTL values, but will have the same 
source IP. Another limitation is that some IP stacks assign the ID values of the IP 
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header by using a pseudo-random generator (RFC 4413-TCP/IP Field Behavior, 
2006). 
Zhang, Papadopoulos, and Massey (2013) made an initial attempt to 
investigate detection of encrypted communication. Since the encryption increases 
entropy, they presented two high-entropy classifiers and used one of them to 
enhance the BotHunter, and showed that BotHunter was able to detect encrypted 
bots. 
Antonakakis et al. (2012) presented a novel detection system, called Pleiades, 
which is able to detect machines within a monitored network that are compromised 
with DGA-based botnets. Pleiades monitors traffic below the local recursive DNS 
server and analyzes streams of unsuccessful DNS resolutions (Name Error or 
NXDomain Responses). Pleiades searches for relatively large clusters of NXDomains 
with similar syntactic features, and are queried by multiple, potentially compromised, 
machines during a specific epoch. As shown in Figure 5, there are two phases of 
detection: the first phase discovers the presence of DGA and the second classifies 
the discovered DGA and detects the C&C domain(s). 
 
 
Figure 5. A High-Level Overview of Pleiades (Antonakakis et al., 2012). 
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Antonakakis et al. (2012) claimed that "Pleiades was able to identify six DGAs 
that belong to known malware families and six new DGAs never reported before" (p. 
14). Although their claim that Pleiades can achieve very high detection accuracy, one 
limitation of their evaluation method is "the exact enumeration of the number of 
infected hosts in the ISP network" (p. 14). Because the location of monitoring sensors 
is below the recursive DNS server, they can only obtain a lower bound estimate of 
infected hosts. For example, an IP address that generates DNS traffic may be a NAT, 
firewall, DNS server, or other device that behaves as a proxy. Also, noisy 
NXDomains may be generated to mislead the implementation of Pleiades.  
Yadav and Reddy (2012) proposed methodologies for utilizing failed domain 
names (NXDOMAIN) in the quest for rapid detection of a fluxing botnet’s C&C server. 
They validated their method by detecting Conficker botnets and other anomalies with 
a false positive rate as low as 0.02%. Their technique can be applied at the edge of 
an autonomous system for real-time detection. Since their method is based on 
detecting botnets utilizing high entropy, botnet owners may alter the way domain 
names are created to evade their detection mechanism. 
Farnham and Atlasis (2013) reviewed several utilities used to enable tunneling 
over DNS. They discussed practical techniques for detecting DNS tunneling and 
categorized the detection techniques into two categories: payload detection 
technique, which is used to detect specific DNS tunneling utilities, and traffic 
analysis-based technique, which is used to detect DNS tunneling in general. In the 
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payload analysis, they discussed the following techniques for DNS tunneling 
detection: 
1. Size of DNS request and response. 
2. Entropy of hostnames. 
3. Statistical analysis. 
4. Uncommon record types. 
5. Policy violation. 
6. Specific signatures. 
In traffic analysis, they discussed the following techniques: 
1. Volume of DNS traffic per IP address. 
2. Volume of DNS traffic per domain. 
3. Number of hostnames per domain. 
4. Geographical location of DNS server. 
5. Domain history. 
6. Volume of NXDomain responses. 
7. Visualization. 
8. Orphan DNS requests. 
9. General covert channel detection. 
In this research, the NXDomain error will be utilized in a different way to detect 
the DGA implementations; the threshold relies on the percentages of the unique 
NXDomain errors to the total number DNS requests within an epoch. Although the 
DNS Server Failure error is not limited to the FFSN and DF implementations, this 
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error can be utilized to detect FFSN- and DF-based botnets. In other words, the first 
stage will utilize NXDomain and Server Failure errors to detect the rallying to a C&C 
server. 
In the second phase, although polymorphism and metamorphism techniques 
change the form of each instance of bot binary to circumvent signature-based 
detection during the detection and investigative process, the algorithm will use a 
detection technique relying on a signature matching based on encoded SSH 
handshakes within DNS tunnels. 
Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of botnets implementation, as well as 
some detection methods and evasion techniques. The next chapter proposes a 
defense-in-depth approach for DNS-based botnets. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction   
Implementing a comprehensive, holistic approach for botnet detection could be 
a challenging task. Botnets implement different protocols, different architecture, and 
can evade detection methods by tunneling their communications within a range of 
services, DNS being the most predominant. 
Since the DNS protocol can be used at different stages of botnet 
communication, I have used BRO Network Security Monitor (NSM) to design and 
implement a detection mechanism for DNS-based botnets communication. 
Design of the Study  
This thesis proposes an empirical solution to design and implements a 
mechanism for detecting DNS-based botnets at different stages:  
1. Rallying stage when finding the C&C server (DGA, FFSN, and DF). 
2. Transmitting data and controlling the bots (DNS Tunnel). 
Currently, botnets implement DGA and/or fluxing techniques to avoid botnets 
detection and mitigation. The infected machine sends a high volume of DNS requests 
in order to find its C&C server. 
As a botmaster only registers one or a few domain names (previously known) 
to carry out the C&C communication, almost all the DNS requests, generated by 
DGA, sent to find the C&C server will have unsuccessful resolutions (name error or 
NXDomain responses). The detection of DGA implementation was configured based 
on a threshold of NXDomain responses within an epoch. For example, if the infected 
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machine sends more than 100 DNS requests within an hour, and a specific 
percentage of these requests have unsuccessful resolutions, BRO NSM will detect 
the presence of DGA based botnet. 
In FFSN and DF based botnets, the malicious domain name(s) that has/have 
very low TTL forces the DNS systems to frequently refresh the resolution cache of 
the IP addresses associated with the domain(s). Although the DNS Server Failure 
can be related to issues other than fluxing implementations, these unsuccessful 
resolutions of very low TTL domain names (Server Failure) can be utilized for FFSN- 
and DF-based botnets detection. In other words, the detection of FFSN and DF 
implementation was configured based on a threshold of the "Server Failure" 
responses within an epoch. 
The frequency of malicious DNS packets can be controlled by the botmaster to 
evade the detection threshold. In other words, in case the first BRO mechanism fails 
to detect DGA, FFSN, or DF presence, another mechanism will run. The second 
mechanism inspects the DNS payloads for DNS-encrypted tunnels based on SSH 
connections, also implemented with BRO NSM. 
According to Brandhorst and Pras (2006) on their statistical analysis of name 
server traffic, the percentages of NXDomain errors and Server Failures were 8.74% 
and 1.28%, respectively, of the DNS queries. Figure 6 shows DNS statistics at four 
locations. 
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Figure 6. DNS statistics (Brandhorst & Pras, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Multistage detection technique for DNS-based botnets.1 
 
                                            
1 NXD refers to NXDomain errors and SF refers to Server Failure errors. 
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Figure 7 depicts the flowchart for the proposed algorithm. Domain Name 
System traffic is inspected at both stages, in parallel, to detect the multistage 
communications of DNS-based botnets. The first stage detects the rallying to a C&C 
server and the second stage inspects each DNS reply of specific patterns of SSH 
handshakes within DNS tunnels. 
In the first stage of botnet communication (rallying stage), a DGA-detection 
mechanism is applied every 30 minutes to find if total number of DNS requests is 10 
or greater. In this case, two thresholds are used for the unique NXDomain errors: the 
first threshold, which is 8% of the total number of DNS requests, is based on Figure 6 
and used if the total number of DNS requests is 50 or more. The second threshold 
(40%) is used if the total number of DNS requests is between 10 and 50. The second 
threshold is utilized to eliminate false positive detections in idle systems. For 
example, an idle system running DGA has a higher percentage of unique NXDomain 
errors to the total number of DNS requests than the percentage in an active system 
running DGA. In both thresholds, at least four unique NXDomain errors are required 
for DGA detection. 
In fluxing detection, which is another method for rallying, different thresholds 
are set. The fluxing detection mechanism is applied every 30 minutes if the total 
number of DNS requests is 8 or greater. In this mechanism, two thresholds are used 
for the Server Failure errors. If the total number of DNS requests is 50 or greater, the 
first threshold is used, which is 6% of the total number of DNS requests. The second 
threshold (26%) is used if the total number of DNS requests is between 8 and 50. 
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Similar to the DGA mechanism, the second threshold is utilized to eliminate false-
positive detection in idle systems implementing fluxing techniques. In both 
thresholds, at least three Server Failure errors are required for fluxing detection. 
The DNS threshold, which is 50 DNS requests every 30 minutes, is set below 
the lowest average in Figure 6 (location 1 has an average of 137 DNS requests per 
hour). Since location 1 in Figure 6 has a high percentage of NXDomain errors (33%), 
which indicates a high possibility of DGA existence, the NXDomain threshold (8%) is 
set based on the lowest average of NXDomain errors (location 3). To eliminate false-
negative detection, the Server Failure threshold (6%) is set higher than the Server 
Failure percentage in location 2. 
In other words, different threshold values are set for DGA and fluxing 
detection, based on the DNS statistics in Figure 6, as well as the activity of the 
infected systems. For example, the percentage of NXDomain errors to the total 
number of DNS requests depends on the frequency of DGA and the average number 
of DNS requests on different systems. Thus, these values need to be dynamically 
adjusted with the changing nature of communication. 
Data Collection 
Instead of real-time monitoring with real botnet malware, the dataset was 
collected from the Stratosphere Lab, which is a part of the Malware Capture Facility 
Project at CVUT University, Prague, Czech Republic (Garcia, 2015). The lab has a 
significant dataset of malware traffic captures, including different types of botnets. 
These datasets were used for DGA, FFSN, and DF detection. 
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Regarding DNS encrypted tunnels, Iodine and DNS2TCP were used to setup 
a SSH tunnel between the server and client device. The captured traffic was used for 
SSH connection detection. 
Data Analysis 
In order to implement and analyze the proposed approach, the following 
software, tools, and techniques were required:  
1. BRO Network Security Monitor: intrusion detection system.  
2. Iodine & DNS2TCP: DNS tunneling tools that support SSH.  
3. Wireshark: traffic analyzer.  
4. Security Onion: a customized Linux operating system for intrusion 
detection.  
5. AWS Ubuntu machines:  C&C server and infected machine. 
6. Registered Domain Name. 
Summary 
This chapter covered the proposed detection methodology for DNS-based 
botnets. This methodology is built on a BRO Network Security Monitor to detect both 
DGA- and FFSN-based botnets according to thresholds within an epoch of 
NXDomain and Server Failure responses, respectively. Also, the proposed 
methodology detects DNS-encrypted tunnels through analyzing connection 
establishment within a DNS payload. The next chapter presents more detail about 
data collection and analysis. 
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis  
Introduction 
Different malicious traffic captures were collected from previously infected 
systems. These captures were used for DGA-, FFSN-, and DF-based botnet 
analysis. For SSH connections tunneled in DNS packets, Iodine and DNS2TCP (with 
SSH connections) captures were used for packet analysis. 
Data Presentation 
In this section, the Wireshark packet captures were presented as the following: 
1. Packet capture of DGA-based botnet. This capture was collected from a 
previously infected system and was used to test the BRO detection method for DGA-
based botnets. The complete capture can be found at Wireshark–DGA-based Botnet. 
2. Packet capture of FFSN- & DF-based botnet. This capture was collected 
from a previously infected system and was used to test the BRO detection method for 
FFSN- and DF-based botnets. The complete capture can be found at Wireshark–
FFSN- & DF-based Botnet. 
3. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in Iodine. Iodine is a DNS 
tunneling program that tunnels IPv4 data through a DNS server. It was developed by 
Bjorn Anderson and Erik Ekman. Iodine can be usable when the Internet access is 
firewalled, but DNS queries are allowed. Iodine is written in C and it runs on Linux, 
Mac OS X, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, and Windows (Anderson & Ekman, 2014). 
The packet capture of Iodine traffic was collected from the lab implementation. 
In this lab, the Iodine server and Iodine client were setup as the following: 
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• Iodine server static IP address 52.52.65.253 
• Iodine client IP address 172.31.36.28 
• Subdomain tunnel.ialabs.net  
• Server’s tunnel interface IP address 192.168.250.1 
• Client’s tunnel interface IP address 192.168.250.2 
The complete lab steps can be found in Appendix B. 
4. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in DNS2TCP. DNS2TCP is 
a network tool designed to relay TCP connections through DNS traffic. DNS2TCP 
was written by Olivier Dembour with the contributions of Nicolas Collignon. The 
encapsulation is done on the TCP level. DNS2TCP is composed of two parts: a 
server-side tool and a client-side tool. The server has a list of resources specified in a 
configuration file. Each resource is a local or remote service listening for TCP 
connections. The client listens on a predefined TCP port and relays each incoming 
connection through DNS to the final service (HSC, 2012). 
The packet capture of DNS2TCP traffic was also collected from the lab 
implementation. In this lab, the two sides–the server and the client–were setup as the 
following: 
• DNS2TCP server static IP address 52.52.65.253 
• DNS2TCP client IP address 172.31.36.28 
• Subdomain tunnel2.ialabs.net 
The complete lab steps can be found in Appendix C. 
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Figure 8. Iodine and DNS2TCP lab. 
Figure 8 shows the lab implementation of Iodine and DNS2TCP tunneling 
tools. The system is protected by a firewall that blocks all traffic except DNS on port 
UDP/53. 
Data Analysis 
The packet captures of the previous section were analyzed as the following: 
1. Packet capture of DGA implementation. Figure 9 shows the statistics of 
DNS packets. The "No such name" packets represent the total number of DNS 
responses that return with a NXDomain error. There were 352,756 responses with 
NXDomain error; these responses represented 46.75% of the total DNS packets 
(queries and responses), and 89% of the total requests (532,756/398,397). The "No 
error" packets represent both the total number of DNS requests and the successful 
responses. 
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Figure 9. DNS packets statistics–DGA-based botnet. 
The previous capture shows a high presence of DGA implementation. Setting 
a threshold for DGA detection varies from one network to another. For example, 
when implementing a DGA botnet, botmasters can control the frequency of DNS 
requests to avoid detection, thus, a high threshold of NXDomain errors can be 
evaded by a low frequency (false negative), however, a very low threshold may result 
in false-positive detection, such as typing errors. To eliminate the chance of 
NXDomain errors due to mistyping or other errors not related to the DGA 
implementation, the threshold was set based on unique NXDomain records. 
Figure 10 shows DGA-based botnet traffic. After many unsuccessful 
resolutions, the infected system found the IP address of a C&C server at packet 
number 234,427. 
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Figure 10. Wireshark packet capture of DGA-based botnet. 
2. Packet capture of FFSN & DF implementation. Similar to the previous 
statistics, Figure 11 shows the statistics of DNS packets. The "Server Failure" 
packets represent the total number of DNS responses that return a Server Failure 
error. There were 159 responses with Server Failure errors; these responses 
represented 26.07% of the total DNS packets (queries and responses), and 52.13% 
of the total requests (159/305). 
 
Figure 11. DNS packets statistics–FFSN & DF-based botnet. 
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This capture shows a high percentage of DNS Server Failure packets, and 
setting a threshold for these packets is also a challenge. For example, botmasters 
can control the TTL values and the frequency of DNS requests to avoid Server 
Failure errors, thus, a high threshold of Server Failure errors can be evaded by a 
lower frequency and higher TTL (false negative). However, a low threshold may 
result in a higher false positive. 
Figure 12 shows the DF implementation. There were three IP addresses 
(87.221.209.204, 109.73.179.95, and 185.1.62.82) assigned to four different 
malicious domains (top-web.org, linetechservice.org, serviceline2013.org, and 
servicewebcheck.org); the assignment was done in a “round robin” fashion.  When 
the DNS request (packet No. 15680) was sent, the IP addresses were not yet 
assigned to serviceonline2013.org, thus, packet No. 15683 had a Service Failure 
error since the TTL for serviceonline2013.org had expired. 
 
Figure 12. Domain flux implementation. 
Figures 13 illustrates the concept of FFSN; new IP addresses 
(109.117.185.235, 91.230.157.174) had been used instead of 185.1.62.82. 
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Figure 13. FFSN implementation. 
3. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in Iodine. Figure 14 shows 
the connection negotiation between the server and the client. 
 
Figure 14. Iodine connection negotiation 
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By analyzing the traffic from the Wireshark capture, it was noticed that Iodine 
used some patterns or signatures in its negotiation between the server and the client. 
These patterns were appended to the subdomain (tunnel.ialabs.net), and included 
the following: 
 
 
47  
 
The following figure shows the SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets. The 
SSH connection initialization started at packet No. 4248. 
 
Figure 15. SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets (iodine). 
Iodine uses the NULL RR (QTYPE 10) and provides higher performance by 
allowing the downstream data to be sent without encoding. Each DNS reply can 
contain over a kilobyte of compressed payload data. However, regarding the 
upstream date (the DNS requests), Iodine uses either Base-32 or a non-standard 
Base-64 encoding method (based on a configuration option) (Nussbaum, Neyron, & 
Richard, 2009). 
By analyzing different SSH connections, the following signature was used to 
establish a SSH tunnel: 
eaba82.2hb..Y.w which is equivalent to following hex string: 
\x65\x61\x62\x61\x38\x32\xca\x32\x68\x62\xbe\xee\x59\xd6
\x77 
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4. Packet capture of SSH connection tunneled in DNS2TCP. The following 
figure shows the SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets. The SSH connection 
initialization started at packet No. 4248. 
 
Figure 16. SSH connection tunneled in DNS packets (dns2tcp). 
By default, DNS2TCP uses the TXT RR type. Since DNS2TCP uses Base-64 
encoding, SSH connection packets can be analyzed to find the encoded pattern of 
the normal SSH connection. In a normal situation, a SSH connection contains the 
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_ string. By analyzing packet No. 187 in figure 16, the string 
AAACCFNTSC0yLjAtT3BlblNTSF83LjJwMiBVYnVudHUtNHVidW50dTIuMg0 was 
used to establish a SSH tunnel. This string is equivalent to ��SSH-2.0-
OpenSSH_7.2p2 Ubuntu-4ubuntu2.2. 
To detect other versions of SSH-2.0 connections and/or operating systems, 
only the CFNTSC0yLjAtT3BlblNTSF8 part is used to detect SSH connections 
tunneled in DNS packets. After decoding this Base-64 encoded string, it is equivalent 
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to �SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_. To detect only OpenSSH_ string, only the string 
T3BlblNTSF8 is used. 
In BRO NSM, both Iodine and DNS2TCP queries were logged in DNS.Logs as 
lowercase queries, so the detection script was written based on the lowercase 
equivalents. For example, the string Iodine SSH tunnel eaba82.2hb..Y.w was 
detected by the equivalent hex of its lowercase eaba82.2hb..y.w, which is 
\x65\x61\x62\x61\x38\x32\xca\x32\x68\x62\xbe\xee\x79\xd6\x77 instead 
of  \x65\x61\x62\x61\x38\x32\xca\x32\x68\x62\xbe\xee\x59\xd6\x77. To 
find the complete script for SSH tunneling detection, refer to Appendix D. 
Summary 
This chapter presented and analyzed the packet captures of DGA, FFSN, and 
DF implementations, as well as SSH connections tunneled in DNS tunneling using 
Iodine and DNS2TCP tools. The next chapter discusses the results, conclusion, and 
future work. 
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations  
Introduction  
 As mentioned in the previous chapters, DNS protocol can be implemented for 
botnet communications. Some of these implementations utilize different evasion 
techniques to circumvent the detection and prevention methods. In this study, the 
multistage-detection technique was designed and implemented using the BRO 
Network Security Monitor. This chapter presents the results of the analysis methods, 
conclusion, and future recommendations. 
Results  
This thesis presents an empirical solution to detect DNS-based botnets at 
different stages of their communications. Domain Generation Algorithm-based 
botnets were detected by the percentage of unique NXDomain errors among the total 
DNS queries within an epoch of 30 minutes. The fluxing techniques–FFSN and DF–
were detected by the percentage of total Server Failure errors among the total DNS 
queries within an epoch of two hours. 
Also, this thesis presents some popular DNS tunneling tools that are used to 
tunnel botnet traffic in DNS packets, and presents a signature-based method to 
detect DNS-tunneled botnets that use SSH as their encryption algorithm. Each tool 
has different method to tunnel the traffic. Since SSH is utilized to encrypt the tunnel, it 
is recommended to look for SSH connections wrapped in the DNS packets by looking 
for the encoded patterns of the SSH connection requests. Some tools, such as 
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Iodine, encoded the traffic using a non-standard Base-64 encoding method and other 
tools like DNS2TCP using a Base-64 encoding method. 
From the Iodine lab results, a non-standard encoded pattern for SSH 
connections was detected. In the DNS2TCP lab, a standard encoded pattern for SSH 
connections’ handshaking was detected. These patterns can be used as signatures 
to detect SSH connection handshaking tunneled in Iodine and DNS2TCP tools. 
The following questions and answers provide a summary of the proposed 
solutions: 
Question 1: Was the proposed method able to detect DGA-based botnets? 
Answer: Yes, based on unique NXDomain thresholds. 
Question 2: Was the proposed method able to detect FFSN- and DF-based 
botnets? 
Answer: Yes, based on Server Failure thresholds. 
Question 3: Were the signatures able to detect SSH tunneling in the 
suggested tools? 
Answer:  Yes, the signatures were able to detect SSH tunneling in Iodine and 
DNS2TCP tools. 
Organized and professional botmasters may develop other methods to bypass 
these detection mechanisms. The following questions and answers explain: 
Question 1: Can the botmasters evade the detection of the DGA-, FFSN-, or 
DF-based botnets based on the NXDomain or Server Failure 
thresholds? 
52  
 
Answer: Yes, changing the frequency of the DNS requests will minimizes the 
NXDomain errors within a specific epoch. Also, they may control the 
TTL values properly to avoid the high number of Server Failure 
responses. 
Question 2: Can the botmasters evade the non-standard encoded signatures 
of the SSH connection handshaking? 
Answer: Yes. Like other characteristics and parameters in the DNS traffic, they 
may change the non-standard encoding/decoding code. 
Question 3: Can the botmasters evade the standard encoded signatures of the 
SSH connection handshaking? 
Answer: Creating a large set of possible strings of the encoded SSH 
connection handshaking using the standard encoding methods 
provides a strong mechanism for SSH tunneling detection. For 
example, using Base-64, the encoded pattern of ANSSH-2.0-
OpenSSH_ is QU5TU0gtMi4wLU9wZW5TU0hf, but the encoded 
pattern of ASSH-2.0-OpenSSH_ is QVNTSC0yLjAtT3BlblNTSF8=, 
which is completely different, because Base-64 method takes every 
three bytes and encodes them into four bytes output, so the order of 
the OpenSSH_ string within the packet gives different outputs. 
However, creating a signatures list provides a strong mechanism for SSH 
connections tunneling detection; botmasters may change the trend to use non-
standard encoding/decoding methods to tunnel these connections. 
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Conclusion  
This thesis was to design and implement detection techniques for DNS-based 
botnets at different stages of communications. Using a BRO Network Security 
Monitor, the suggested solutions were able to detect the botnet traffic at the rallying 
stage–when finding the C&C server–as well as, detecting the SSH tunneling 
connections used to encrypt the traffic after finding the C&C server. 
The detection of DGA-, FFSN-, and DF-based botnets was based on a 
threshold value of specific DNS response failures. Whereas, the detection of SSH 
tunneling was based on encoded patterns of SSH connection handshaking within two 
popular DNS tunneling tools. The suggested solutions were able to detect the SSH 
tunneling in Iodine and DNS2TCP. These tools can be utilized to tunnel the SSH 
connections in DNS-based botnets. 
Future Work  
In this thesis, tunneling SSH connections were implemented using two of the 
most popular DNS tunneling tools. In the future, analyzing other tools that support 
SSH connections, such as DNSCAT and OzymanDNS, and creating a large set of 
possible strings of the encoded SSH connection handshaking using the standard 
encoding methods will contribute to the detection efforts.  
Regarding DGA and fluxing techniques, finding an automated way to set the 
thresholds of DNS queries, NXDomain, and Server Failure based on the behavior of 
the system will improve the detection mechanisms. The threshold settings need to be 
dynamically adjusted with the changing nature of communication which would 
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optimize false positives and negatives. Also, to minimize the false positive of fluxing 
detection, the DNS Server Failure error–resulting from fluxing implementations–
needs to be differentiated from similar errors caused be other issues. 
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Appendix A: DNA Message Format 
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Appendix B: Iodine Lab Implementation 
1- Create two Ubuntu instances on Amazon Web Services. 
2- Assign static IP addresses to these instances. 
3- Install Iodine on both instances 
sudo apt-get install iodine 
4- Configure the inbound traffic on the server to allow only the incoming DNS traffic. 
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the server and 
to the client only from my remote location. 
 
Figure 17. DNS tunneling server firewall (inbound configuration). 
5- Configure the inbound traffic on the client to block all incoming traffic. 
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the client only 
from my remote location. 
 
Figure 18. DNS tunneling client firewall (inbound configuration). 
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6- Block the outbound SSH traffic on the client. 
 
Figure 19. DNS tunneling client firewall (outbound configuration). 
7- Register a domain name (ialabs.net) and delegate a subdomain (tunnel.ialabs. 
net) to the DNS tunneling server. 
 
Figure 20. Domain name settings. 
8- Using Putty, connect to the Iodine server at 52.52.65.253. 
9- Run iodined on the tunneling server 
sudo iodined -c -f -P mysecret 192.168.250.1 
tunnel.ialabs.net 
 
Figure 21. Running iodined on the DNS tunneling server. 
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Figure 22. Tunneling interface on the server (192.168.250.1). 
10- Make sure that tunnel is setup and working troubleshooting your iodine 
setup. 
 
Figure 23. DNS tunneling server troubleshooting. 
11- Using Putty, connect to the Iodine client at 35.165.67.21. 
12- Run iodine on the tunneling client 
sudo iodine -f -P mysecret 52.52.65.253 tunnel.ialabs.net 
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Figure 24. Running iodine on the DNS tunneling client. 
 
 
Figure 25. Tunneling interface on the server (192.168.250.2). 
13- Run the following command 
ssh ubuntu@192.168.250.1 -D 9999 
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Figure 26. SSH connection tunneling (iodine). 
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Appendix C: DNS2TCP Lab Implementation 
1- Create two Ubuntu instances on Amazon Web Services. 
2- Assign static IP addresses to these instances. 
3- Install dns2tcp on both instances by running the following command: 
sudo apt-get install dns2tcp 
4- Configure the inbound traffic on the server to allow only the incoming DNS 
traffic. 
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the 
server and to the client only from my remote location. 
 
Figure 27. DNS tunneling server firewall (inbound configuration). 
5- Configure the inbound traffic on the client to block all incoming DNS traffic. 
Note: For experiment purposes, all inbound traffic was allowed to the client 
only from my remote location. 
 
Figure 28. DNS tunneling client firewall (inbound configuration). 
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6- Block the outbound SSH traffic on the client. 
 
Figure 29. DNS tunneling client firewall (outbound configuration). 
7- Register a domain name (ialabs.net) and delegate a subdomain (tunnel2.ialabs. 
net) to the DNS tunneling server. 
 
Figure 30. Domain name settings. 
8- Using Putty, connect to the dns2tcp server at 52.52.65.253. 
9-  Configure the dns2tcpd.conf as the following: 
 
10- Using Putty, connect to the dns2tcp client 35.165.67.21. 
11- Configure the dns2tcpc.conf as the following: 
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12- Run the dns2tcp server using the following command on the tunneling server: 
sudo dns2tcpd -F -d dns2tcpd 2 -f /etc/dns2tcpd.conf 
 
Figure 31. Running dns2tcp on the DNS tunneling server. 
13- Run the dns2tcp client using the following command on the tunneling client: 
sudo dns2tcpc -z tunnel2.ialabs.net 52.52.65.253 -f 
/etc/dns2tcpc.conf 
 
Figure 32. Running dns2tcp on the DNS tunneling client. 
14-  Run the following command on the tunneling client: 
sudo ssh ubuntu@127.0.0.1 -p 8888 -D 8080 
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Figure 33. SSH connection tunneling (dns2tcp). 
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Appendix D: BRO Network Security Monitor Scripts 
DGA Detection Script 
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Figure 34. DGA detection–script output. 
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FLUX Detection Script 
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Figure 35. Flux detection–script output 
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SSH Tunneling Detection Script 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Iodine SSH tunneling detection. 
 
 
 
Figure 37. DNS2TCP SSH tunneling detection. 
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Appendix E: DGA-, FFSN-, and DF-based Botnets Dataset 
 
